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Introduction
After a long arbitration in New York, a Canadian company wins substantial damages against a
British multinational, only to see a federal court vacate the award.1 Two ground are given for vacatur:
the arbitrator was biased and the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the applicable law. Not deterred by
the vacatur, the winning claimant seeks to enforce the award against the defendant's London bank
accounts.
What effect (if any) should a court in England give the American award? Should an English
court ignore the arbitrator's decision or the federal judge's order? Should the English court make its
own investigation into the legitimacy of the vacatur?
Unconditional respect for all foreign annulments will hardly promote efficient arbitration, since
an award might be annulled in bad faith or in violation of fundamental notions of justice. Without some
deference, however, victims of tainted arbitrations must prove de novo the award's defects in every
jurisdiction where they either have assets or seek to rely on subsequent awards.
The treaty framework for international arbitration provides no clear guidance on when
annulments should have extraterritorial effect.2 In Paris and Washington, however, courts have recently
recognized awards vacated at the arbitral situs,3 sparking a debate on two rival policies: extending
1

The verbs “annul,” “vacate” and “set aside” represent different labels for analogous actions,
depending on the country, and are used interchangeably in this Article.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1958) [hereinafter New York Convention]. In
force in 120 nations, the Convention mandates foreign award enforcement subject to a set of defenses
that include vacatur at the arbitral situs. See discussion in text at notes 33-43.
2

3

See discussion of Hilmarton and Chromalloy cases in text at notes 7-25.
2

comity toward foreign judgments and enforcing arbitral awards. The proper balancing of these policies
depends in large measure on one's conclusions about the nature of commitments to resolve crossborder commercial disputes through arbitration.
Like prisms, these French and American cases help to refract the interaction of three
overlapping legal orders: national statutes, international law and privatized dispute resolution. While
lending itself to few elegant dogmas, analysis of award annulment offers insights into how these legal
systems interact, and suggests two modest conclusions.
First, courts should defer to annulments that are consistent with procedural fairness and
international public policy. Such deference follows not from any explicit treaty mandate, but from the
parties' mutual commitments. Merchants who contract for an arbitral situs should be held to the implicit
consequences of the bargain, whether this means narrow or broad judicial scrutiny. If the chosen
review standards appear problematic on post-dispute reflection, market forces will direct future
arbitrations elsewhere. Although this approach occasionally will be inconvenient for some business
managers, it provides a better balance of social and economic consequences than other realistic
alternatives.
Second, countries that host international arbitration should maintain their traditional role in
monitoring the fairness of proceedings conducted within their borders. At the same time, these national
legal systems should seek to limit the type of intrusive review procedures that invite disregard of
annulments. To this end, the United States should adopt a separate statutory regime for international
commercial arbitration, embodying more laissez-faire review than might apply to purely domestic
cases.
3

I. Annulled Awards
A. Options
Returning to our opening scenario, several approaches are open to British judges considering
enforcement of awards vacated at the arbitral situs. They might (1) never defer to annulments,
(2) always defer to annulments, or (3) defer to annulments only on certain conditions, such as
compatibility with public policy or with English grounds for vacatur.
Traditionally, annulment was thought to uproot an award so as to make it unenforceable
abroad.4 There is no reason, however, that this must be so. An annulled award might well take its
legitimacy solely from the enforcement forum, much as a contract void in one nation can be enforced in
another.5 As discussed below, the French and American court cases mentioned in the introduction

See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 §III(4), (5), at
331-358 (1981); Albert Jan van den Berg, Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 133 (R. Lillich & C. Brower eds., 1994). For
illustration, see Southern Pacific Properties v. Egypt, where vacatur in Paris led to dismissal of
enforcement in the Netherlands. Cour d'appel de Paris, 12 July 1984, 1986 REV. ARB. 75, 23 I.L.M.
1048 (E. Gaillard trans., 1984); District Court of Amsterdam, 12 July 1984, [1988] N.J. 67, 10
Yearbook Comm. Arb. 487 (1985), 1986 Rev. Arb. 101, 24 I.L.M. 1040 (A.J. van den Berg trans.,
1985). The Dutch action was dismissed after French decision was confirmed by the Cour de
Cassation, 1ère Ch. civ., 6 January 1987, 1987 REV. ARB. 469, note Ph. Leboulanger, 26
I.L.M.1004 (E. Gaillard trans., 1987).
4

5

For example, a court in the United States might grant interest on a debt contracted in Saudi
Arabia even if a Saudi court would not. Whether the relevant choice-of-law principles looked to Saudi
public policy might depend on matters such as the nationality and residence of the parties, the place of
performance and the otherwise applicable law. See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §187
(1971) (law chosen by the parties given effect unless in conflict with a fundamental policy of “a state
which has a materially greater interest . . . in the determination of the particular issue”). See generally
MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 536-49 (10th ed. 1996).
4

took exactly this approach. 6

B. Case Law
In the many faceted saga of Hilmarton v. OTV,7 an arbitrator in Geneva denied a claim for
consulting fees, erroneously believing that a contract subject to Swiss law violated Switzerland's public
policy.8 After a cantonal court vacated the award on the basis of this mistake, a second arbitral tribunal
gave damages to the claimant.9

6

A Belgian court also refused to enforce an annulled award rendered in Algiers against the
Algerian government's gas exporter. See Sonatrach v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Trib. de 1ère Instance
de Bruxelles, 23 July 1987, Trib. de 1ère Instance de Bruxelles, 6 Dec. 1988, 1990 Annales de
droit de Liège 267, 7 ASA Bull. 213 (1989), 15 YEARBOOK COMM. ARB. 370 (1990), aff’d, Cour
d'Appel de Bruxelles, 9 Jan. 1990 (8ème Ch) 1990 J. T. 386. The special facts of the case (New
York Convention held not to have retroactive application) make it inappropriate for comparative
analysis. See generally Guy Horsmans, Actualité et évolution du droit belge de l'arbitrage, 1992
REV. ARB. 417, 426.
1997 REV. ARB. 376, note Ph. Fouchard. See generally Philippe Fouchard, La Portée
internationale de l'annulation de la sentence arbitrale dans son pays d'origine, 1997 REV. ARB.
329; Jean-François Poudret, Quelle Solution Pour en Finir avec L’Affaire Hilmarton?, 1998 REV.
ARB. 7 (1998); Eric Schwartz, French Supreme Court Renders Final Judgment in the Hilmarton
Case, 1997 INT’L ARB. L.R. 45; Georges Delaume, Enforcement Against a Foreign State of an
Arbitral Award Annulled in the Foreign State, 1997 (No. 2) REV. DROIT DES AFFAIRES INT./INT’L
BUS. L.J. 253; Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard
Annulment, 9 ICC BULL. (May 1998), at 14. For an earlier decision along these lines, see Pabalk v.
Norsolor, Cour de Cassation, 9 Oct. 1984, 1985 REV. ARB. 431, note B. Goldman; 112 J. DR. INT'L
679 (1985), note Ph. Kahn (award vacated in Austria qualified for enforcement in France).
7

8

The consultant successfully helped obtain a contract for drainage in Algiers. While there was
no allegation of bribery, the consultant’s activity allegedly ran afoul of an Algerian statute on commercial
intermediaries.
9

The award was rendered in August 1988, and thus subject to challenge for "arbitrariness"
under Article 36 of the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat. Since January 1989 awards in
international arbitration would normally be subject to the Loi fédérale sur le droit internationale privé
5

In France both awards were recognized, each in a separate proceeding: first the annulled
decision in favor of the defendant;10 then the award in the second arbitration in favor of the claimant.11
Ultimately the Cour de Cassation held that the first judgment, recognizing the annulled decision,
prevented recognition of the second arbitral award.12
The position of the Cour de Cassation on res judicata is understandable. However, its
enforcement of the vacated award is less so. The court's reasoning that international arbitrations are not
integrated into the legal order of the arbitral situs13 is hardly consistent with the fact that French judges
annul awards in international arbitrations conducted in France.14 Moreover, in Hilmarton the ultimate

(LDIP). Upheld by the Swiss Tribunal fédéral, the Geneva court found that the conflict with Algerian
legislation did not constitute a violation of Swiss public policy. See 1993 REV. ARB. 315 (Court de
Justice du Canton de Genève, 17 Nov. 1989), 322 (Tribunal fédéral, 17 Apr. 1990).
Cour d’Appel de Paris, 1993 REV. ARB. 300, relying on NCPC arts. 1498, 1502, which
limit appeal against award recognition to grounds that do not include annulment of the award where
rendered. The appellate court was upheld by the Cour de cassation, 1994 REV. ARB. 327, with
commentary by Charles Jarrosson; English translation in 9 MEALEY'S INT’L ARB. REP., E-3 (May
1994); 20 Y.B. COM . ARB. 663. See generally Vincent Heuzé, La Morale, L'Arbitre et Le Juge,
1993 REV. ARB. 179.
10

The order of the Nanterre Tribunal de Grande Instance, which recognized the second
award (as well as the Swiss court's annulment of the first award), was confirmed by the Versailles Cour
d'Appel, 29 June 1995, 1995 REV. ARB. 639.
11

12

10 June 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 376.

See Cour de cassation decision affirming the lower court's recognition of the annulled
award, 1994 REV. ARB. 327 (stating that the Geneva award "n'était pas intégrée à l'ordre juridique
de [la Suisse]").
13

See NCPC art. 1502. See also Bruno Leurent, Société Procédés de préfabrication pour
le béton v. Libye, 1998 REV. ARB. 399, 407. Commenting on a court's refusal to monitor arbitration
conducted in France because its official seat was Geneva, Leurent notes the inconsistency of giving
significance to the arbitral seat in that case while assuming that the Hilmarton award was not integrated
14

6

result of recognizing the annulled award was that the claimant who prevailed at the bargained-for situs
was hindered in obtaining unpaid fees.15
In the United States a similar scenario arose in Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egypt,16 where an
arbitral tribunal in Cairo had awarded damages to an American company for Egypt's breach of a
military helicopter maintenance contract.17 The award was then vacated for the arbitrator's failure to

into the Swiss legal order. See id.
15

A different result obtained across the Channel, where the English High Court recognized the
second award, finding that the award offended neither the contract’s governing law nor the public
policy of the arbitral situs. Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court, 24 May 1999, reprinted in 14
MEALEY'S INT’L ARB. REP. §A (June 1999). Since the claimant’s performance did not include acts
contrary to English public policy, it was irrelevant that an English arbitrator might have decided
differently. Compare Soleimany v. Soleimany, [1993] 3 W.L.R. 811 (refusing to enforce an award
that on its face implemented a smuggling contract).
939 F.Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). See generally Richard Hulbert, Further Observations
on Chromalloy: A Contract Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied and an Opportunity Foregone,
13 ICSID REV. 124 (1998); Gary Sampliner, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After
Annulment in their Country of Origin, 11 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 22 (Sept. 1996); Eric
Schwartz, A Comment on Chromalloy: Hilmarton à l'Américaine, 14 (No. 2) J. INT'L ARB. 125
(June 1997); Hamid Gharavi, A Nightmare Called Hilmarton, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 20
(Sept. 1997); Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the New York Convention: Further Reflections on
Chromalloy, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 20 (Apr. 1997); Pierre Karrer, Judicial Review of
International Arbitration Awards: Who Needs it?, 1998 TABLE TALK 9 (International Arbitration
Club, London); Albert Jan van den Berg, Enforcement of Annulled Awards?, 9 ICC Bull. 15 (1998);
Dana Freyer & Hamid Gharavi, Finality and Enforceability of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 ICSID
REV. 101 (1998); Lawrence Newman & Michael Burrows, Setting Aside Arbitral Awards Under
the New York Convention, N.Y. L.J., 18 Nov. 1997; Stephen Ostrowski & Yuval Shany,
Chromalloy: United States Law and International Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1650 (1998); Ray Chan, The Enforceability of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States,
13 B.U. INT'L L. J. 141 (1999).
16

17

Text of the award can be found at 11 (No. 8) MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., C-1(Aug. 1996)
(D.D.C. July 31, 1996).
7

apply the correct law, a non-waivable ground for annulment in Egypt.18
Despite the annulment, a U.S. federal court ordered enforcement of the award against the
defendant's American assets.19 In an opinion with neither precedent nor progeny,20 the court reasoned
that since the Federal Arbitration Act does not list error of law as a ground for vacatur, the claimant
"maintains all rights [to award enforcement] that it would have in the absence of the Convention."21
Two aspects of the federal court's controversial reasoning deserve special mention. First, the
Egyptian practice of annulling erroneous awards does not differ significantly from the way American
courts vacate awards for “manifest disregard of the law” or improper choice-of-law reasoning. 22

See arts. 53(1)(d), 54, Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994, reproduced in SMIT'S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS, Vol. 1, EGY B1. The contract was
subject to Egyptian law, and the Cairo court reasoned that this meant the civil code.
18

19

Not surprisingly, the Paris Cour d'Appel also enforced the award. See 1997 REV. ARB.

395.
20

In Baker Marine Ltd. v. Chevron Ltd, 191 F. 3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999) the court refused to
enforce two awards rendered in Lagos but vacated by a Nigerian court. Nigerian award published in
14 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. D-3. (August 1999). In addition, the Second Circuit has held that a district
court should wait to enforce an Italian award until after judicial review in Italy. See Europcar Italia v.
Maiellano Tours, 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing possibly "conflicting results and the
consequent offence to international comity"). While respectful of the judiciary at the arbitral situs, the
deferral of enforcement in Europcar is not the same as the deference to the foreign court in Baker
Marine. An American judge might merely want the benefit of the foreign court's findings.
21

939 F.Supp 910. The court referred to Convention Article VII, which provides that the
Convention shall not “deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such
award is sought to be relied on.” See text at note 40. The Second Circuit in Baker Marine, supra note
20, rejected this argument by noting that "[n]othing suggests that the parties intended United States
domestic arbitral law to govern their dispute." 191 F. 3d 194.
22

On "manifest disregard," see note 100. On review of choice-of-law methodology, see
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman, 514 U.S. 52 (1995), which interprets the proper scope of a New
8

Second, to invoke the vacatur standards of the Federal Arbitration Act23 risks giving the impression that
American courts can annul foreign awards, a result at odds with existing law24 and efficient arbitration.25

II. The Interaction of Treaty and Statute
A. Control Mechanisms
Judicial review of arbitral awards constitutes a form of risk management designed to safeguard

York choice selection clause.
Chromalloy looked to 9 U.S.C. §10 in Chapter I of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
applies to domestic awards. However, foreign awards are subject to Chapter II, which gives Chapter I
residual effect only if not inconsistent with Chapter II. See 9 U.S.C. §208.
23

See International Standard Electric Corporation v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera,
Industrial Y Commercial, 745 F.Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
did not allow vacatur of an award rendered in Mexico even if the merits of the dispute were to be
decided under New York law).
24

25

In theory, parties might stipulate that an arbitration will be conducted in one country subject
to the procedural law of another. New York Convention Article V(1)(e) speaks of awards set aside
by a competent authority “of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made”
(emphasis added). Thus two Israelis might elect to arbitrate in New York subject to the arbitration law
of Israel. In such rare situations, however, it would create unnecessary conflict if Israeli courts were to
attempt to vacate the resulting award, since courts in New York might also set aside a local award that
violated the mandatory American norms. See generally, Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Western
Company of North America, 1987 ALL INDIA REP. 674, 13 Y.B. COM . ARB. 473 (1988) (action to
annul foreign award on the basis that Indian law applied to the arbitration agreement); National Thermal
Power Corp. v. Singer Corp., 18 Y.B. COM . ARB. 403 (1993) (action to annul London award when
Indian law governed the dispute). Compare Renusager Power Co. v. General Electric Co., discussed
in Tony Khindria, Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in India, 23 INT’L BUS. LAW. 11 (Jan. 1995).
9

against perverse arbitrators and shameless intermeddlers.26 Such public scrutiny of arbitration is
inevitable when the winners ask courts to recognize awards by seizing assets or by denying the losers
access to otherwise competent courts.27
Inherent in judicial review is a tension between two rival goals of efficient dispute resolution,
which underlie most aspects of arbitration law. Finality, promoted by freeing awards from challenge,
competes with community confidence in control mechanisms that protect against enforcement of
aberrant decisions.
Award finality enhances political and procedural neutrality, which is compromised if the winner
must re-litigate the case. Without a reliable alternative to the uncertainty of third country tribunals28 and
the other side's "hometown justice,"29 many transactions will remain unconsummated, or be concluded

26

A decision-maker cannot be an arbitrator unless the person alleged to have waived court
jurisdiction has in fact authorized the relevant individual to decide the disputed issues.
See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION & ARBITRATION (1992).
27

In seeking recourse to third country courts, uncertainties result from factors such as forum
non conveniens, lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the absence of comprehensive jurisdiction and
judgments treaties. See WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION (1995); William W.
Park, When and Why Arbitration Matters, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE 73 (G. Beresford
Hartwell ed., 1997); William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection, 8 TRANS. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1998).
28

29

The reality of litigation bias may be less significant than the perception that such prejudice
exists. In federal civil actions in the United States, foreigners actually fare better than domestic parties,
perhaps because fear of bias causes foreigners to continue to judgment only with particularly strong
cases. See Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1122 (1996).
10

at increased prices to cover the risk of biased adjudication. 30
The second goal of efficient arbitration, community confidence that aberrant decisions will not
be enforced, implicates judicial scrutiny of an arbitration's basic procedural fairness.31 Fidelity to the
parties' shared expectations in this regard is as important as speed and economy.
Courts monitor the arbitral process in two distinct modes, depending on whether the reviewing
forum has jurisdiction over the parties' assets or serves only as a convenient arbitral situs.32 In the latter
case, review occurs before any attempt to enforce the arbitrator’s decision, as courts simply pronounce
an award void upon a motion to vacate, or valid upon a motion to confirm. By contrast, enforcement
actions call for more dramatic judicial behavior, typically attachment of property or refusal to hear a
claim allegedly covered by the arbitrator's decision.
In domestic transactions the distinction between these two types of review will rarely be
30

Greater risks require greater returns. To illustrate, imagine two potential investments, one in
Country A presenting an opportunity for a large profit, but with a good chance that local courts will be
biased against a foreign party, and another in Country B yielding a smaller profit, but with fair dispute
resolution. Depending on how large the disparity between the expected returns, many risk-averse
foreign merchants will choose the lower return coupled with the fairer legal system. See generally
William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation, 12 (No. 4)
J. INT'L ARB. 99 (1995).
31

Commercial actors are unlikely to retain confidence in a dispute resolution system allowing
arbitrators to roll dice, flip coins or consult the entrails of disemboweled poultry. Nor do business
managers expect arbitrators to deny one side the opportunity to present its case, or to decide issues
never submitted to them.
See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION &
ARBITRATION 113 (1992) (distinguishing between "primary" and "secondary" control). See also
Anthony Diamond & V.V. Veeder, The New English Arbitration Act 1996: Challenging an
English Award Before the English Court, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 47 (1997) (making the distinction
between passive waiting for an opponent to seek award enforcement and active challenge to an award
immediately after it is made).
32

11

important, since both occur in the same legal system, often pursuant to simultaneous motions to confirm
and to vacate. In cross-border disputes, however, pre-enforcement scrutiny and enforcement actions
can occur in different countries. Understanding the interaction of these two jurisdictions requires a brief
look at the New York Convention.

B. The New York Convention
1. Framework
The New York Convention operates on two levels to promote the international currency of
commitments to arbitrate. First, the Convention requires deference to valid arbitration

12

agreements.33 Second, courts must enforce foreign awards34 as they would domestic ones.35

Award

recognition, however, is subject to several defenses. One group furthers the loser's right to a fair
arbitration, by allowing courts to reject awards tainted with excess of authority and procedural
irregularity.36 Another set of defenses protects the forum's own interest in withholding support for
awards that deal with non-arbitrable subjects or violate public policy. 37
The Convention's effectiveness depends largely on each country's national arbitration law.38

33

Convention Article II(3) requires national courts to "refer parties to arbitration" in respect of
matters covered by an agreement to arbitrate.
34

Although its principal focus is on foreign awards (i.e., awards rendered in a country other
than the one where enforcement is sought), the Convention also covers awards “not considered as
domestic.” This latter category includes awards arising from disputes that directly implicate international
commerce. See Lander Co. v. MMP, Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (1997) (arbitration between two American
companies selling shampoo in Poland); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983)
(arbitration between Swiss company and Norwegian shipowner).
35

Convention Article III provides for award enforcement "in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon," leaving open a theoretical possibility of
onerous conditions on all arbitral decisions, domestic and foreign. Such abuse of rights would violate
the Convention, just as onerous state arbitration laws violate the Federal Arbitration Act. See Doctor's
Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
36

Convention Article V(1)(a)-(d) deals with invalid arbitration agreements, lack of due
process, arbitrator excess of authority and irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal. See also
Convention Article V(1)(e), concerning annulled awards, discussed in text at notes 45-57.
37

Convention art. V(2). A growing consensus urges a narrow application of the public policy
defense to award enforcement. See Audley Sheppard, in Public Policy as a Ground for refusing
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, INT'L LAW ASS'N, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, TAIPEI CONFERENCE (1998). See also Homayoon Arfazadeh, L’ordre
public du fond et l’annulation des sentences arbitrales internationales en Suisse, 1995 REV. SUISSE
DR. INT. & DR. EUROPÉEN 223.
38

For one attempt at achieving uniformity in arbitration law, see UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, adopted 21 June 1985, UN Doc. A/40/17, Annex 1 (hereinafter
13

Arbitration agreements must be enforced if not "null and void," essentially a notion of local contract
principles.39 More significantly, the Convention says nothing about proper or improper annulment
standards, but leaves each country free to establish its own grounds for vacating awards made within its
territory.
The Convention will not deprive interested parties of the right to rely on awards to the extent
allowed by an enforcement forum's own law.40 Therefore the structure of national arbitration law
becomes significant. For example, the French arbitration decree relevant in Hilmarton requires courts
to recognize foreign awards unless contrary to international public policy,41 and permits appeal of
recognition orders only on limited grounds that do not include annulment.42 By contrast, the Federal
Arbitration Act explicitly ties into the New York Convention, calling for confirmation of foreign award if

UNCITRAL Model Law). See generally HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEWHAUS, GUIDE TO
THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989).
39

Convention art. II(3). In the United States the validity of arbitration clauses is generally
determined by state law principles governing contract formation. See First Options v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Only rarely does one find invocation of supra-national standards for the validity
of arbitration agreements. See Rhone Mediterranée v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983)
(referring to an “internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud or waiver”). See also
Municipalité de El Magreb v. Dalico, Cour de Cassation (France), 1994 REV. ARB. 116, 117 (holding
that the existence of an international arbitration clause is determined without reference to national law
("sans qu'il soit nécessaire de se référer à une loi étatique")).
40

See Convention art. VII, quoted in note 21.

41

NCPC, art. 1498.

NCPC Article 1502 permits appeal of recognition orders for (i) lack of a valid arbitration
agreement, (ii) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal, (iii) excess of authority, (iv) failure to
respect due process (principe de la contradiction) and (v) violation of international public policy.
42

14

no treaty reasons exist to deny recognition. 43 Since vacatur at the arbitral situs is one ground for nonrecognition under the New York Convention, some observers consider Chromalloy to be wrongly
decided.

2. Convention Article V(1)(e)
a. Text
The analytic architecture for much of the dialogue about annulled awards lies in that part of the
New York Convention providing that awards set aside at the arbitral situs lose the benefit of the treaty's
enforcement scheme. The English version of Article V(1)(e) reads: “Recognition and enforcement of
the award may be refused . . . if . . . [the award] has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”44 The French text
lends itself to a more forceful interpretation,45 while the Chinese, Russian and Spanish versions comport
43

9 U.S.C. §207.

44

Under Convention Article XVI the treaty’s Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish
texts are "equally authentic." On the comparison of treaty texts with different meanings, see Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 33(4), 23 May 1969, UN DOC. A/CONF. 39/27, which
provides for adoption of the "meaning which best reconciles the texts having regard to the object and
purposes of the treaty." See generally, Georgios Petrochilos, On the Mechanics and Rationale of
Enforcing Awards Annulled in their State of Origin under the New York Convention, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 858 (1999).
45

The French text provides that "recognition and enforcement will not be refused unless the
award . . . was annulled where rendered" (La reconnaissance et l'exécution de la sentence ne
seront refusées que si la sentence . . . a été annulée ou suspendue). This future indicative was given
a mandatory reading in Clair v. Berardi, Paris Cour d'Appel, 20 June 1980, 1981 REV. ARB. 424, note
Mezger, discussed in VII Y.B. COM . ARB. 319 (1982), a case that would be decided differently today
under the 1981 Arbitration Decree. See also Philippe Fouchard, La Portée internationale de
l’annulation de la sentence arbitrale dans son pays d’origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329, 344
15

with the permissive English.46
Some scholars argue that under the Convention annulment triggers a universal effect, making an
award unenforceable in all places where presented for enforcement.47 According to one view, the
Convention contains an implicit understanding that the arbitral situs will monitor an arbitration's
procedural integrity, in exchange for which other countries will recognize awards that pass muster
where rendered.48 This power to uproot an arbitrator's decision would mean that the place of
arbitration could invalidate a defective award once and for all.49
Other commentators read the Convention as allowing enforcement courts discretion in dealing
with annulled awards.50 They rely on the Convention's permissive language (enforcement "may" be

(commenting that "the English text’s ambiguity does not exist in the French version").
See Richard W. Hulbert, Further Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract
Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and an Opportunity Foregone, 13 ICSID REV. 124, 144 (Spring
1998); Jan Paulsson, May or Must Under the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and
Linguistics, 14 ARB. INT’L 227, 229 (1998).
46

See Albert Jan van den Berg Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 133, 137 (R. Lillich & C. Brower eds., 1994)
(referring to the "erga omnes effect" of annulled awards); W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and
Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 1, 58 (1995) (warning (in connection with attempts to enjoin arbitration conducted abroad) of
dangers in failing to recognize the "primacy of the procedural law of the place of arbitration").
47

See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION 113-120 (1992).
48

49

See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 355-58 (1981).

See Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard
Annulment, 9 ICC BULL. 14, 29 (May 1998); Jan Paulsson, The Case for Disregarding Local
Standard Annulments Under the New York Convention, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 99 (1996).
50
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refused), as well as the "more favorable law" provision in Article VII, which in some circumstances
permits national law to override more restrictive Convention terms.51 Under this view, the latitude
allowed judges depends on the structure and content of national arbitration law. 52

b. Context
For better or for worse, the New York Convention was not designed to address the overenforcement that occurs when annulled awards are recognized. Rather, it was intended to deal with the
under-enforcement of awards that resulted from the cumbersome "double exequatur" requirement of an
earlier arbitration treaty, which called for judicial recognition at both the arbitral situs and the
enforcement forum.53
In response to the unsatisfactory state of prior law, the International Chamber of Commerce
proposed a new treaty that aspired to make arbitration "completely independent of national laws."54

51

See Convention Art. VII, discussed in text at notes 21 & 40.

52

See discussion of the difference between French and American arbitration law, text at notes

40-43.
See Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Geneva 1927, art. 4, 92
L.N.T.S. 301 (requiring the party seeking recognition to have an award "duly authenticated" under the
law of the country where made, as well as evidence that the award was not "open to opposition, appel
or pourvoi en cassation" or pending proceedings to contest its validity).
53

54

Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Report and Preliminary Draft Convention,
ICC Brochure No. 174 (1953), UN DOC. E/C.2/373, reprinted in 9 ICC BULL. 32 (May 1998). In
language prefiguring Professor Goldman's theories of "a-national arbitration" (see note 103) the ICC
proposed giving "full value to the autonomy of the [parties'] will," noting with admirable candor that this
position contradicted the traditional view that commercial relationships are "subject to some national
law." Id. at 32. For a critique of the ICC proposal, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND
REVISION 825-33 (1971) (stating at 829 that “The point overlooked [by the ICC] is that if an
17

The United Nations Economic and Social Council, however, rejected broad notions of autonomous
"international" awards, in favor of simply making "foreign" awards more transportable from one country
to another.55
The middle course eventually taken in drafting the New York Convention was one that
reduced, but did not eliminate, the role of the arbitral situs. Confirmation at the place of arbitration is no
longer necessary, but enforcement of vacated awards may be refused. One consequence of this
compromise has been uncertainty about the fate of annulled awards.

c. Interpretation
Interpreting Article V(1)(e) should begin with the "ordinary meaning [of the terms of the treaty]
in their context and in the light of [the treaty's] object and purpose."56 Applying this principle, the text
might be read simply as an acknowledgment that no treaty violation occurs when annulled awards are
not recognized. This reading is favored by the contrast between the mandatory terms of Article III

[enforcement] action of this type should arise, some community or communities must assert a valid
interest in supervision”).
55

UN DOC. E/2704 & Corr. 1 (1955). For comments by governments see UN DOC. E/2822
& Add.1-6 (1956-58). See generally ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION
CONVENTION OF 1958, at 6-8 (1981).
56

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 31, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.
39/27, entered into force 27 Jan. 1980, 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 81 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Article 32
allows recourse to other elements when the ordinary meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or leads to
"manifestly absurd or unreasonable" results. See generally PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF TREATIES §§142-148, 96-98 (J.M. & P. Haggenmacher trans., 2d English ed. 1995). The
Vienna Convention does not apply retroactively (see art. 4), and thus as a technical matter does not
cover the New York Convention.
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(awards "shall" be recognized) and the permissive language of Article V (annulled awards "may" be
refused recognition).
A more energetic reading suggests that the Convention contemplates comity regarding foreign
judgments. Stating that enforcement may be refused affirms a positive norm (as in "one may worship as
conscience dictates") rather than a value-neutral choice (as in "one may order either chocolate or
vanilla"). Supporting this view is the fact that Article V(1)(e) is nestled among defects that clearly make
awards unenforceable, such as void arbitration agreements, lack of due process and excess of
authority.57

C. Approved Annulment Standards
Under the European Arbitration Convention, 58 annulment constitutes a ground for nonrecognition of awards only if based on approved vacatur standards. These track the first four defenses
to award enforcement under the New York Convention: absence of a valid arbitration agreement, lack
of opportunity to present one’s case, arbitrator excess of jurisdiction and irregular composition of the
arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, courts in Germany could ignore a French order setting aside a Paris
award for violation of “international public policy,” a ground for vacatur in France that is not among the

57

Convention art. V(1)(a)-(d). Article V(2) also uses the very same permissive language
(recognition "may be refused") with respect to public policy violations, which almost by definition make
awards unenforceable, notwithstanding recourse to local courts in circumscribing the relevant policies.
See European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Geneva, 21 Apr. 1961,
art. 9, 484 U.N.T.S. 349, which was adopted to supplement the New York Convention among
residents of member states. For support of this position, see Paulsson at note 7.
58
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four listed defenses.59
The chief difficulty in this approach lies in its promiscuous taxonomy, which indiscriminately
mixes both good and bad review standards. While some annulments falling outside the approved
grounds impede efficient arbitration,60 others (such as mechanisms to deal with arbitrator bias or clear
legal error61) further legitimate interests of the regulating state62 or the parties.63
In addition, the line between approved and unapproved grounds for vacatur is not as clear-cut
as the European Convention suggests. For example, misapplication of the law (not an approved
standard) by arbitrators deliberately rejecting governing legal principles might be interpreted as excess
of authority (which is an approved annulment standard).64

III. Comity Toward Annulments
A. Bad Faith and Public Policy

See reference to ordre public international as a ground for annulment in France under
NCPC art. 1502(5).
59

60

For instance, requiring that all arbitrators sign awards (a standard abolished by Austria in
1983) gives dissenting arbitrators a tool to sabotage the arbitration.
61

In some cases, of course, biased behavior and manifest disregard of the law might be
characterized as conduct outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
62

For example, London courts that hear appeals on points of English law (allowed by 1996
Arbitration Act unless the parties agree otherwise) promote the development of a legal system on which
many business managers rely.
63

Some litigants, for example, might see judicial review as enhancing predictability in contract
interpretation.
64

On the distinction between error of law and excess of authority, see notes 100 & 102.
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To end litigation in a way that promotes efficient cross-border economic relationships, many
developed legal systems enforce foreign judgments either pursuant to treaty65 or as a matter of
discretionary comity.66 In much the same way that courts enforce arbitral awards without examining
their merits,67 principles of comity call for recognition of foreign judgments on condition that there be no
serious procedural irregularity or violation of public policy.68
The soundest policy toward annulment orders is to treat them like other foreign money

See, e.g., European Union Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Bruxelles, 27 Sept. 1968, art. 27(1).
65

See generally RONALD A. BRAND, ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD (1992); Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of
Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International
Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (1991); DENNIS CAMPBELL, ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS (1997); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1310 (1985).
66

67

See Convention Articles III and V, discussed in text corresponding to notes 34-37.

68

Factors relevant to comity include the absence of fraud, public policy violations and conflict
with a prior judgment or forum selection agreement, as well as the foreign court's impartiality,
jurisdiction and granting of due process and proper notice. For U.S. law on comity, see Restatement
(Third) Foreign Relations Law §§481, 482 ("impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due
process of law"); Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §98 ("fair trial in a contested proceeding");
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (13 U.L.A. 261) §4. Under different names,
similar principles are contained in conflict-of-laws rules in France (Cour de Cassation, Arrêt Munzer,
7 Jan. 1964, discussed in BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ §§440-454 (2d ed. 1997),
Germany (ZPO arts. 328, 722, 723), and Switzerland (LDIP art. 27). In England, foreign awards can
be enforced by common law actions on a debt. See Adams v. Cape Industries, [1990] 1 ch. 433
(C.A) (denying enforcement of a Texas judgment due to lack of due process). Reciprocity is
sometimes required. See German ZPO arts. 328(1) & (5) and 722-23; U.K. Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895) (declining to
recognize French judgment on the assumption that French courts did not recognize American
judgments, but stating that the merits of a foreign judgment should not otherwise be tried again when
there has been "opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction . . .
and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court . . . or fraud in procuring the judgment").
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judgments, according them deference unless procedurally unfair or contrary to fundamental notions of
justice.69 While controversial annulments will arouse the same type of resistance as other problematic
judgments,70 there is no reason that these cases cannot be disposed of within comity's flexible
framework.71
As an aspirational model, the extension of comity to foreign judgments holds both parties to the
consequences implicit in selecting one arbitral situs rather than another.72 This can be of particular
importance when annulment is followed by a second arbitration yielding a decision different from the

69

The functional similarity between annulments and other money judgments can be illustrated
by a contract interpreted under English law by a London court resulting in a judgment that "Defendant
owes nothing to Claimant." Had the contract provided for arbitration in London subject to appeal on
points of English law, the same conclusion would have been expressed by annulment of an arbitrator's
erroneous award for claimant.
70

One reason for American interest in a multilateral judgments treaty is that courts do not
always enforce foreign judgments. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Proposed
Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Working Document No. 144 E; synthesis by C. Kessedjian, 1998). See generally Russell J.
Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments Recognition Convention and What
Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 174 (1998).
71

One intriguing variant on the good faith standard suggests that annulments be disregarded if
"arbitrary or clearly erroneous." See Gary H. Sampliner, Enforcement of Nullified Foreign Arbitral
Awards: Chromalloy Revisited, 14 (No. 3) J. INT’L ARB. 141, 161-162 (1997). The virtue of this
approach is that it points toward the heart of the annulment problem: aberrant judicial behavior. Its
drawback is that courts must look at an arbitration's substantive merits. For a methodology that weighs
multiple factors (grounds for vacatur, party intentions, enforcement forum policies, the need for
uniformity and a presumption favoring foreign judgment recognition), see Stephen Ostrowski & Yuval
Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650 (1998).
72

See discussion in text at nots 78-90.
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first.73 Unless vacatur triggers non-recognition,74 the annulled award might receive res judicata effect
at the place where property is located, creating a Gresham's Law of awards in which bad decisions
drive out good ones.75 Such a "first-come-first-served" rule legitimizes a race to the courthouse likely
to be won by the party relying on the earlier (annulled) award. The infrequency of such conflicts, like
the rarity of arbitrator corruption, does not mean they can be ignored.
If only good faith judgments will be recognized, unflattering comparisons among legal systems
will sometimes be made. Yet it is difficult to see a better alternative in a heterogeneous world lacking
shared traditions of judicial independence.76
Applying a comity standard to Hilmarton would lead to enforcement of the second (nonannulled) award. No suggestion was made that the Geneva judiciary lacked integrity or that the
cantonal arbitration statute violated international public policy. However, the fate of the award in
Chromalloy under a comity approach would be complicated by the suspicion in some quarters that the
Egyptian government exercised undue influence on the Cairo court. As in other areas of the law where

Contrast French and English decisions in Hilmarton, discussed in notes 7 & 15 and
corresponding text
73

74

In some cases, of course, vacated award will be refused enforcement even without comity,
due to overlapping grounds for annulment and non-recognition. For example, if arbitrators in New
York disregard their mission, the award could be vacated under §10 of the Federal Arbitration Act; the
excess of jurisdiction would also impair recognition in Paris under both NCPC Article 1502 and New
York Convention Article V.
75

Named for the 16th century British financier, the original Gresham’s law observed that "bad
money drives out good." If two coins have equal nominal value but different metal contents, the one
with less precious metal remains in circulation.
A different rule would normally obtain in federal systems. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S.
230 (1908) (interpreting the "full faith and credit" clause in Constitution Article IX).
76
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good faith and procedural integrity are relevant, the party challenging the award would have to muster
direct or circumstantial evidence of bias or other impropriety.
While injustice sometimes results when a court sets aside an award against a local party (as in
Chromalloy), this danger can be minimized through the choice of a disinterested arbitral venue with
limited review standards. Indeed, the arbitral venue is the one place subject to party control. Careful
contract drafting permits selection of an arbitral seat in which neither side has an inside track to the
courts. By contrast, the enforcement situs will often be the losing side's home country.77

B. Enforcing Bargains
1. Implied Rules of the Road
Deference to good faith annulments often furthers the very same interests as enforcement of the
arbitration agreement and award: holding the parties to their bargain. Just as an agreement to arbitrate
in London means driving to hearings on the left side of the road, so it means that proceedings are
subject to the English Arbitration Act.78
Arbitration clauses implicate several related undertakings, both explicit and implicit, each of

This point was noted in Jean-François Poudret, Quelle Solution Pour en Finir avec
L’Affaire Hilmarton?, 1998 REV. ARB. 7, 22 (1998) ("[L]e juge du siège est en général plus
neutre que celui de l'exequatur . . .”) as well as in Dana Freyer & Hamid Gharavi, Finality and
Enforceability of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 ICSID REV. 101, 113 (1998) ("self-help is available .
. . by carefully selecting the arbitral situs").
77

78

§69 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, reprinted in 36 ILM 155(1977), allows judicial
review on questions of English law if the parties have not agreed otherwise. In all events an award is
subject to judicial review for arbitrator excess of jurisdiction and serous procedural irregularity. Id. §§
67-68.
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which must be interpreted in a way that neither ignores nor distorts the others.79 In addition to agreeing
to settle disputes privately, the parties commit themselves to a specific arbitral venue, selected by them
either directly or through their chosen arbitral institution.80 Inherent in the understanding about situs is
an expectation that proceedings will be subject to that country's mandatory procedural safeguards.81

Arbitration rules and contract stipulations providing that awards will be "final and binding"82

79

For some of the principles applicable to interpreting commitments such as those inherent in
arbitration clauses, see generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW §6.4, at
130-35 (1991); STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH:
FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT §1.3.8, at 16-17 (1995); 1 CHITTY ON
CONTRACTS §13-006-008, at 621-624. (A.G. Guest ed., 27th ed. 1994).
80

In some cases the parties delegate the choice of a situs, like the selection of the arbitrators,
to an arbitral body.
For a recent articulation of this view, see in Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel
Ltd. (Q.B., 20 Jan. 1999), [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 315; reported in The Times (London), 1 March
1999 at 41; comment by Hong-Lin Yu, Defective Awards Must be Challenged in the Courts of the
Seat of the Arbitration -- A Step Further than Localisation?, ARBITRATION 195 (August 1999).
After a CIETAC arbitration in Beijing, the losing party was deemed to have waived its right to resist
enforcement of the award in England, due to an unreasonable failure to present its case in an arbitration
resumed after its initial stages. Mr. Justice Coleman wrote, "Ferco had not been unable to present its
case. On the contrary ... its counsel had simply failed to take that opportunity." Id. at 327. His opinion
continued with the dictum:
In international commerce a party who contracts into an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign
jurisdiction is bound ... by the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts of the seat of the arbitration.
If the award is defective or the arbitration is defectively conducted the party who complains of
the defect must int he first instance pursue such remedies as exist under that supervisory
jurisdiction. That is because by his agreement to the place in question as the seat of arbitration
he has agreed not only to refer all disputes to arbitration but that the conduct o the arbitration
should be subject to that particular supervisory jurisdiction.
Id. at 330-31. Comment by Hong-lin Yu, 65 ARBITRATION 195 (1999), [1999] INT'L A.L.R. 83.
81

See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, art. 28(6) (award "binding"); LCIA Rules, §26.9 (award
"final and binding"); AAA International Arbitration Rules, art. 27(1) (award "final and binding");
82
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must be read against the background of the arbitration's legal framework. In this context, "finality"
means "finality as allowed under relevant arbitration laws," which in some countries subject awards to
mandatory judicial control mechanisms.83 Moreover, in a world where most legal systems do not
impose merits review, the choice of an arbitral seat that does monitor an arbitrator's legal error argues
for an intent to select a level of judicial scrutiny different from what is available elsewhere.
Ignoring the implications of the parties' direct or indirect choice of situs permits one side to
change its mind about judicial review after seeing who gets the rough edge of the bargain.84 While
many arbitration lawyers favor limited court scrutiny,85 some business managers opt for a judicial safety

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 32(2) (award "final and binding").
See, e.g., M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that waiver provisions in the ICC Rules “merely reflect a contractual intent that the issues joined and
resolved in the arbitration may not be tried de novo in any court” (quoting Iran Aircraft Industries v.
Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992))), stay denied, 935 F. Supp. 910 (1996), subsequent
appeal, 143 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d
141 (2d Cir. 1992); First National Supermarkets v. Retail Wholesale & Chain Store Employers Union,
118 F.3d 892 (2d Cir. 1997). The 1996 English Arbitration Act allows pre-dispute waiver of appeal
on points of law (§69), but not waiver of challenge for serious procedural irregularity or excess of
jurisdiction (§§67-68).
83

84

For analysis of when and why the law restrains people from reneging on commitments, see
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS (1998). See
also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (discussing
the reliance, efficiency and fairness notions underlying contract enforcement).
See Ken Rokison, Pastures New: The 1997 Freshfields Lecture, 14 ARB. INT'L 361,
363 (1998) ("the presumed intention of the parties [is] that all aspects of the merits of their dispute
should be decided by their chosen tribunal and not by the court"); Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral
Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment, 9 ICC BULL. 14, 25 (May 1998), (labeling
as "mythical" parties who seek merits review through choice of arbitral situs).
85
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net against aberrant results.86 Fairness requires respect for the degree of review imposed at the
selected arbitral venue,87 particularly since at contract signature all parties are behind a veil of ignorance
about the outcome of any potential arbitration. 88

2. The Ill-Advised Business Manager
Holding business managers to the consequences of their choice of arbitral situs raises the
possibility that ill-advised executives, perhaps lacking competent counsel, might be burdened with an
inconvenient level of judicial review. In some instances a manager might accept an arbitration clause
only on the insistence of a trading partner with superior bargaining power.
Unwise choices, however, form part of the warp and woof of commerce.89 Contract terms
often appear imprudent in hindsight, or are accepted as the price of booking a sale. Yet a sophisticated
corporate executive's lack of wisdom or bargaining power rarely constitutes a valid excuse for escape
from contract commitments.

See Carroll E. Neesemann, More Certainty Comes to Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., 26 Mar.
1998, at 1, col. 2; Carroll E. Neesemann, Party-chosen Arbitral Review Standards Can Inspire
Confidence in the Process, 5 DISP. RESOL. 18 (Fall 1998).
86

87

In addition to the form of judicial review, choice of an arbitral seat implicates court selection
of the arbitrators in the event of party default. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law art. 11(3); English
Arbitration Act §18; Federal Arbitration Act §5; Swiss LDIP art. 179; French NCPC arts. 1454,
1455.
88

On the relationship between fairness and the parties' "veil of ignorance,” see JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE §24, at 136 (1971).
89

In one well known case, the business managers agreed to the ICC Arbitration Rules (which
provide for waiver of appeal) while at the same time stipulating to appeal on the legal and factual merits
of the case. See Lapine v. Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Choosing an arbitral situs is not unlike selecting an arbitral institution to provide rules and
appoint arbitrators. A Chicago entrepreneur who contracts for arbitration under the rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) cannot disregard an unfavorable award because the ICC
procedures appear idiosyncratic in comparison with more familiar American arbitral practices.90
The law's normal response to a merchant's second thoughts about an honest bargain, whether in
regard to arbitral rules or an arbitral situs, would be to leave the merchant to make better choices in the
next transaction. There is no reason market forces cannot discipline the selection of arbitral venue as
they do other contract terms.

C. Refusal to Vacate
When courts deny motions to vacate, how should an enforcement forum treat the decision not
to vacate an award?91 For example, if an American judge rejects allegations that an award was
procured by bribery or otherwise violates international public policy, should a London court be bound
by this determination if enforcement in sought in England?
Little law exists on the res judicata effect of foreign refusals to vacate. Absent conflicting
90

Unique aspects of ICC procedure include "Terms of Reference" (which sometimes bar new
claims and counterclaims) and institutional scrutiny of the award (which may cause arbitrators to rethink
their decision). Moreover, the ICC does not allow the "non-neutral" arbitrator common in domestic
American arbitration (see AAA 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AAA
Pub. No. 196-20M), but requires all arbitrators to be independent of the parties. See respectively
Articles 18, 27 & 7 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, discussed in W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W.
PARK & JAN PAULSSON, ANNOTATED GUIDE TO 1998 ICC ARBITRATION RULES (1998).
91

A different issue presents itself when the losing party in an allegedly defective arbitration
simply fails to invoke remedies available in the arbitration, thereby waiving its right to challenge the
award later. See discussion of Minmetals v. Ferco supra note 81.
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commitments under any relevant treaties for enforcement of foreign judgments, the best approach to
such "non-annulments" allows enforcement judges to make up their own minds on whether awards are
defective within the context of New York Convention defenses. Comity for foreign judgments should
not require violation of an enforcement forum’s own public policy.
There is, of course, a lack of symmetry in deferring to award annulments but not to award
confirmations. Yet the two types of judgments raise distinct considerations. A judge that defers to
English vacatur of a London award does not more than leave the parties with the consequences of the
chosen situs. However, for any court to enforce an award that in its opinion violates fundamental public
policy norms would run afoul of its own interest in avoiding active assistance to illicit conduct. The New
York Convention contemplates this double standard by providing that awards may be denied
recognition if deemed defective by either the enforcement forum or the arbitral situs.92

IV. The Role of National Arbitration Law
A. Models of Judicial Scrutiny
Framing sound policy regarding annulled awards requires an understanding of why, and on
what grounds, nations monitor arbitration conducted within their borders.93 Two principal models have
emerged for review of awards at the arbitral seat. The most popular gives losers a right to challenge

92

Convention Article V(1)(a)-(d) and Article V(1)(e).

93

While the New York Convention attempts to harmonize defenses to enforcement, it says
nothing about correct or incorrect grounds for vacatur. On the role of arbitration law in general, see
Michael Mustill, Too Many Laws, 63 ARBITRATION 248 (1997).
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awards only for excess of authority94 and basic procedural defects such as bias or denial of due
process.95 The second paradigm supplements scrutiny of an arbitration's procedural fairness with a
right to appeal an award's substantive legal merits.96
Some countries allow a choice between these alternatives, with default rules requiring that

94

In some cases duly appointed arbitrators may overreach their mandates. In other cases,
absent a valid a arbitration clause covering the controverted event, the excess of authority may be that
of an unauthorized meddler.
See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act §10; French NCPC art. 1502; Swiss LDIP art. 190;
UNCITRAL Model Law art. 34. While these last three statutes do not enumerate bias explicitly, other
bases for vacatur could serve to deal with this defect. For example LDIP includes in its list of award
defects both unequal treatment of the parties (art. 190(2)(d)) and violation of public policy (art.
190(2)(e)).
95

See 1996 English Arbitration Act §§67-69. See William W. Park, The Interaction of
Courts and Arbitrators in England, [1998] INT'L ARB. L. REV. 5, reprinted in 13 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 21 (June 1998).
96
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litigants either "opt in"97 or "opt out"98 of appeal on the substantive merits of the case.99 Certain arbitral
regimes provide hybrid grounds for vacatur, such as "manifest disregard of the law"100 or

For American cases allowing contractual expansion of grounds for vacatur, see Lapine
Technology v. Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Technologies v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Syncor International Corp. v. David L.
McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Fils et Cables d'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp,
584 F.Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); New England Utilities v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F.Supp.2d 53
(D.Mass. 1998). The opposite conclusion was suggested in Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago
Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1995), which states that federal court review power cannot be
created by contract. See generally Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147 (1997); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Can
Arbitration Coexist with Judicial Review?, ADR CURRENTS, Sept. 1998, at 1; Alan S. Rau,
Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225 (1997). Compare the position
in France, where courts have voided arbitration clauses attempting to include appellate review
procedures other than as provided by the NCPC. See Diseno v. Société Mendes, 27 Oct. 1994,
Cour d'Appel de Paris, 1995 REV. ARB. 263. See generally PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., TRAITÉ DE
L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL §1597, at 931 nn. 142-46 (1996).
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See 1996 English Arbitration Act §69 (requiring exclusion of appeal on questions of English

law).
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Switzerland offers a choice among federal standards (limited to procedural integrity and
public policy under LDIP Article 190), more expansive scrutiny under cantonal standards (including
vacatur for "arbitrariness" under Article 36(f) of Concordat intercantonal sur l’arbitrage) and
exclusion of all judicial scrutiny (assuming neither party has a Swiss residence or place of business, the
parties may conclude an explicit exclusion agreement (déclaration expresse/ ausdrückliche
Erklärung) under LDIP Article 192). See generally PIERRE LALIVE ET AL., DROIT DE L'ARBITRAGE
INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE (1989). See also Belgian Code judiciaire, art. 1717,
discussed in notes 111-113 and corresponding text.
Introduced through dictum in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), "manifest disregard of
the law" may (depending on perspective) either incarnate arbitrator excess of authority or serve as a
back door to merits review of awards “contrary to the plain language” of the contract. See Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990). Awards in international arbitrations in the United
States may be vacated for "manifest disregard." See Alghanim v. Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d 15 (2nd Cir.
1997). An expanded notion of “manifest disregard” has been applied in employment discrimination
claims. See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, 148 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1286
(1999). See generally Barry Garfinkel & Rona Shamoon, 3 ADR CURRENTS, Dec. 1998, at 1;
Norman Poser, Judicial Review of Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
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31

"arbitrariness,"101 implying something beyond a simple mistake but not necessarily clear excess of
authority.
In assessing a national legal system, the winner will look for finality, while the loser will want
careful judicial consideration of questionable aspects of the decision. Although no system will reconcile
perfectly these rival goals, a middle ground can provide judicial review for the grosser forms of
procedural injustice.
The text of the law, of course, must be read in the context of its application. Even a statute that
limits judicial review to procedural irregularity may allow wiggle room for an overzealous judge to
examine a dispute’s legal merits under the guise of correcting an arbitrator's excess of authority.102
Moreover, in parts of the world lacking a tradition of judicial independence, the business community
may prefer no judicial review at all, taking its chances with potential misbehavior by arbitrators as the
lesser of two evils.

471 (1998).
Swiss Concordat intercantonal sur l’arbitrage, art. 36(f) (defining arbitrariness to include
"evident violations of law or equity").
101

See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review
of Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 126, 138 (1997) (suggesting that mistakes of law can constitute
excess of authority). See also Inter-City Gas v. Boise Cascade, 845 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1988). In
England, Lord Denning reversed otherwise unappealable decisions by reasoning that since judges are
not authorized to make mistakes, in so doing they exceed their power. See DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE
OF THE LAW 74 (1979) ("Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes outside the jurisdiction
conferred on it and its decision is void."). See also Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow
School, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, 743 (C.A.) ("The distinction between an error which entails absence of
jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being eroded.").
102
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B. The Interests At Stake
The extent and timing of judicial review of awards at the arbitral situs implicate a long-standing
debate. French academics have urged adoption of a relatively delocalized regime, with the arbitral situs
imposing little or no judicial scrutiny of international arbitration.103 British and American jurists tend to
advocate a more territorial approach, with greater leeway for courts to monitor arbitrations conducted
within their jurisdiction.104
While court scrutiny incident to award enforcement is uncontroversial (judges can hardly attach
assets without first examining the piece of paper to be enforced), it is less obvious why there should be
review before a motion is made to recognize an award, at least when the arbitration involves neither
property nor activity at the arbitral situs. In this context, concern for the independence of international
dispute resolution has led one of France's leading arbitration scholars to suggest complete elimination of
pre-enforcement judicial review.105
See Berthold Goldman, Les conflits de lois dans l'arbitrage international de droit privé,
109 II RECUEIL DES COURS 347, 379-380, 479-480 (1963) ("Unless one adopts the irrational and
unjustifiable system of attaching the arbitral process to its seat . . . any search for a way of grounding
the arbitration in some system leads one unavoidably to the need for an autonomous non-national
system."); Philippe Fouchard, La Portée internationale de l'annulation de la sentence arbitrale
dans son pays d'origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329, discussed in note 105 and corresponding text.
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See Francis Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157
(P. Sanders ed., 1967), reprinted in 2 ARB. INT'L 241 (1986); Michael Kerr, Arbitration and the
Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 15 (1985) ("No one having the
power to make legally binding decisions . . . should be altogether outside and immune from [the legal]
system."); William W. Park, Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration,
32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1983); William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:
Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647 (1989).
104

See Philippe Fouchard, La Portée internationale de l'annulation de la sentence
arbitrale dans son pays d'origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329, 351-352. Fouchard admits the proposal’s
105

33

Although conceptually and administratively simple, the elimination of all pre-enforcement judicial
review would be unwise. As discussed below, the absence of any court scrutiny at the arbitral situs
would adversely affect both the victims of defective arbitrations and the interests of the reviewing state
itself.

1. Efficiency
By serving as the seat of an arbitration, a nation vests an award with presumptive validity under
the New York Convention, thereby granting arbitrators power to create legal consequences throughout
the world. Such support of the arbitral process arguably carries with it a duty to vacate biased or
capricious decisions so that victims of irregularity may better resist defective awards.106
Even in a world without the New York Convention, judicial review at the arbitral situs makes
sense as an efficient way to control aberrant arbitral behavior, increasing the commercial community's
confidence that arbitration will not be a lottery of erratic results. Court scrutiny relatively soon after the
proceedings permits the creation of a record when documents and witnesses are still available and
before recollections become stale.
radical nature by observing, “That which is most bizarre is not necessarily most illogical” (La plus
saugrenue n'est pas la plus illogique.). Id. at 351. For an earlier incarnation of his views on the
subject, see PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 22-23 (1964), in
which he urges that particularities of national norms and conflict-of-laws rules should no longer play any
role in international arbitration.
106

Convention Article V(1)(e) permits non-recognition of an award set aside where "made,"
which will normally be the designated seat of proceedings, notwithstanding the place of signature or
location of hearings. However, in Hiscox v. Outhwaite, [1991] A.E.R. 641, an award signed in Paris
was considered made in France although the arbitral seat for purposes of appeal remained in England.
The result would be different under England's 1996 Arbitration Act.
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Review at the situs also enhances the efficiency of arbitration by furthering respect for awards
abroad. This concern lay at the heart of France's international arbitration decree,107 promulgated after
French courts held that they lacked power to vacate awards made in international arbitrations.108 By
allowing award annulment for procedural irregularity, excess of authority and violation of public
policy,109 the decree addressed fears that a complete absence of judicial control might lead foreign
courts to hesitate to enforce awards made in France.
Without a right to have procedurally unfair awards vacated at the situs, victims of injustice must
prove an award's illegitimate character de novo wherever it might be presented for recognition. To be
effective, of course, situs review must operate in tandem with comity toward foreign annulments, thus
linking debate on the role of the arbitral situs with the problem of annulled awards.110
Perhaps the best evidence that some court scrutiny is needed at the arbitral situs lies in
Belgium's failed experiment in mandatory “non-review” of awards. Hoping that a completely laissezfaire system would attract arbitration, Belgium in 1985 eliminated all motions to vacate awards in

107

Décret No. 81-500, 12 May 1981, 1981 J. OFFICIEL RÉP. FRANÇAISE 1398-1406.

See Gen. Nat'l Maritime Transp. Co. v. Société Götaverken Arendal, 21 Feb. 1980, Cour
d'appel de Paris, 1980 REV. ARB. 524; AKSA v. Norsolor, 9 Dec. 1980, Cour d'appel de Paris,
1981 REV. ARB. 306, 20 I.L.M. 887 (1981).
108

NCPC art. 1502 (permitting awards in international arbitration to be annulled for invalid
agreement, irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal, excess of jurisdiction, failure to respect due
process or violation of international public policy).
109

110

On the delocalization debate, see discussion at notes 103-05 and corresponding text.
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disputes between foreign parties.111 Contrary to what had been expected, however, the law created
more anxiety than comfort,112 and a new statute now leaves a safety net of judicial review as the default
rule.113

2. Fertilization of Local Law
Where local law governs the interpretation of a contract, one school of thought supports
mandatory judicial review as a way to fertilize the development of the forum's substantive legal
principles. The assumption is that court cases create precedents that provide behavioral rules to guide
the conduct of business outside a particular dispute.114 For this reason England once restricted waivers
of appeal on points of English law in admiralty, commodities and insurance arbitrations (where English
law enjoys a certain preeminence),115 which permitted these areas of the law to be fertilized with

See art. 1717(4) of Belgian Code judiciaire as enacted in 1985, before amendment of 19
May 1998, effective 17 August 1998.
111

See Bernard Hanotiau & Guy Block, La loi du 19 mai 1998 modificant la législation
belge relative à l’arbitrage, 16 SWISS BULL. 528, 532 (1998).
112

Effective 17 August 1998, Article 1717 (4) of the Belgian Code judiciaire provides that
challenge to awards must be made through an explicit statement: “Les parties peuvent, par une
déclaration expresse dans la convention d’arbitrage ou par une convention ultérieure, exclure
tout recours en annulation d’une sentence arbitrale lorsqu’aucune d’elles n’est soit une personne
physique ayant la nationalité belge ou une résidence en Belgique, soit une personne morale ayant
en Belgique son principal établissement ou y ayant une succursale.”
113
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Under the "public law model" of litigation, cases guide future transactions of non-litigants.
See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between
Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273 (1995).
1979 Arbitration Act §4 (abrogated in 1996), discussed in William W. Park, Judicial
Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 87 (1980).
115
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judgments covering modern commercial controversies.
As England was abolishing the right of appeal in these "special category" disputes, securities
arbitration in the United States was illustrating the need for such safeguards. Since the U. S. Supreme
Court upheld the arbitrability of customer claims against brokerage houses,116 there has been a decided
decrease in court decisions dealing with broker-customer relations, and a resulting freeze in the relevant
law.117 The crippling effect on legal development is particularly worrisome with respect to domestic
consumer transactions, as the corresponding American arbitral awards traditionally do not state reasons
and are not published.118

V. Separating Domestic and International Arbitration
A. An International Arbitration Act for the United States
Arbitration is not an all-terrain vehicle. Different arbitration statutes may be needed for different
types of disputes. In particular, the limited court scrutiny suitable for arbitration among international
business managers may not be optimum in consumer and employment transactions, with their special

See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (fraud claims under
Exchange Act §10b and Rule 10b-5); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490
U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act §12(2) claims).
116

117

See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION §11.2.5, at 344 (1998).

118

For a comparison of the situation with respect to international commercial awards, see W.
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ch. 19 (2nd ed. 1990). See also 1 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1971-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains
eds., 1990); 2 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-90 (Sigvard Jarvin et al. eds., 1994); 3 ICC ARBITRAL
AWARDS 1991-95 ( Jean-Jacques Arnaldez et al. eds., 1997).
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risk that abusive arbitral procedures will be imposed on commercially weaker parties.119
Nevertheless, the United States subjects most arbitration to a single statutory framework.120
Consequently, anti-abuse measures aimed at potentially unfair consumer and employment arbitration
hang like Damoclean swords over private international dispute resolution conducted in the United
States.121

119

Most observers rightly see an agreement to waive otherwise competent courts as
qualitatively more serious than other contract terms, such as price or interest rate. On the perceived
abuse of employment arbitration, see Renteria v. Prudential Ins., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997);
Prudential Ins. v. Lai 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,
500 U.S. 20 (1991); Wright v. Universal Maritime Services, 119 S.Ct. 391 (1998); Stephen J. Ware,
Employment Arbitration & Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996). For similar
concerns about consumer arbitration, see Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (1998); ITT
Cons. Fin. Corp. v. Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (1993); Teleserve Sys. v. MCI, 659 N.Y.2d 658
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (A.D. 1st Dept. 1998);
Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp. (11th Cir. No. 98-6055, June 23, 1999), 12 FLA. L. WKLY.
FED. C 964 (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause failing to provide "minimum guarantees" permitting
a borrower to enforce statutory rights under the Truth in Lending Act); Symposium on Arbitration in
the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. (1995); Lisa Myers, NBC Nightly News, 14 July 1999
<http://www.msnbc.com/news/ 289800.asp> (report on arbitration of credit card disputes).
While collective bargaining arbitration rests on its own statutory basis, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 185, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to almost all other
contracts that in any way involve interstate commerce. See Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265 (1995). State statutes fill gaps in federal arbitration law only if consistent with the latter's general
purposes. See Alan S. Rau, The UNCITRAL Model Law in State and Federal Courts: The Case
of Waiver, 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 223 (1995); Alan S. Rau, Does State Arbitration Law Matter At
All?, ADR CURRENTS, June 1998, at 19. The Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion of "contracts of
employment" has been narrowly interpreted to cover only contracts to transport goods or provide
services directly in foreign or interstate commerce. See, e.g., Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st
Cir. 1971).
120

121

For example, courts have ordered costly discovery about the fairness of institutional
arbitration rules used in employment arbitration. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, 965 F.Supp.
190 (D. Mass. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). See also discussion of
vacatur for "manifest disregard of the law" at note 100.
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A separate legal framework for international arbitration, along lines already adopted in other
jurisdictions,122 would meet the need for a more neutral playing field in cross-border litigation, where
the perception of judicial bias can cause productive transactions to falter.123 An international statute
would also permit broader reform than simply removing consumer and employment arbitration from the
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, which would otherwise still have to address domestically nurtured
concerns.124 In addition, repackaging the law of private dispute resolution into clearer language and a
more orderly structure can be expected to reduce transaction costs in choosing an arbitral venue.125

B. Review Standards
In the United States, an international arbitration act at the federal level would first make clear
that narrow review standards cover awards in cross-border disputes,126 regardless of whatever

See legislation in Belgium, France and Switzerland, discussed respectively in notes 113,
107 and 99. See also Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Hong Kong Laws ch. 341, part IIA §34AD, which for international arbitration incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law.
122

123

See discussion at notes 29-30.

Such domestic concerns are discussed in National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Proposed Revisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Denver, July 1999).
See also Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatization of Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999); Michael Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A
Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927 (1996).
124

125

Making the United States a more user-friendly place to arbitrate would also increase
invisible exports in the form of work for local arbitrators, lawyers and experts.
126

The statute would complement Federal Arbitration Act Chapters II and III, which deal with
enforcement and confirmation (but not vacatur) of awards covered by the New York Convention,
supra note 2, and the Inter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration (Panama 1975), 14
I.L.M. 336 (1975).
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protective regime applies in domestic arbitration. Consumer and employment contracts, as well as
agreements with small businesses, would be explicitly excluded from the statute's scope,127 thus
reducing the type of conflict that has sometimes arisen abroad when international arbitration statutes
were not clear about their coverage.128
Grounds for vacatur might be patterned on those of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 129 but with
several modifications. First, arbitrator bias and corruption should be included explicitly as grounds for
annulment.130 Second, no reference should be made to "public policy," a chameleon-like concept that
risks misapplication when refracted through parochial cultural lenses.131 Finally, parties might be given

127

Consumer contracts include agreements with individuals related to property, services or
credit, unless within the scope of an individual’s profession. For an example of existing restrictions on
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, see EU Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L95) 29.
France also prohibits pre-dispute arbitration clauses except in contracts between merchants. See
CODE CIVIL art. 2061; CODE DE COMMERCE art. 63.
See Meglio v. Société V2000, Cour de cassation, 1997 REV. ARB. 537, note E. Gaillard;
1998 REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87, note V. Heuzé (holding that French resident's purchase of limited
series Jaguar escaped restrictions on consumer arbitration).
128

129

Article 34 of the Model Law allows award vacatur for (i) invalidity of the agreement, (ii)
lack of proper notice, (iii) excess of arbitral jurisdiction, (iv) irregular composition of the arbitral
tribunal, (v) non-arbitrable subject-matter and (vi) conflict with public policy.
130

Since the Model Law contains no explicit reference to bias, public policy must be pressed
into service to deal with arbitrator bias and corruption.
See, e.g., Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F.Supp.
1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (where the court vacated application of a French interest rate in a FrancoAmerican contract). While public policy analysis is unavoidable when judges seize property, such
malleable notions are unnecessary where no enforcement is requested. For example, if French and
British companies choose Boston to arbitrate a dispute that has no effect in the United States, then
unless one side seeks to enforce the award locally, American judges can leave to colleagues abroad the
task of deciding whether the award is compatible with European competition law. Similar arguments
might be made with respect to vacatur for excess of authority and violation of due process; however,
131
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explicit options either to contract out of all review or to contract into review on the merits of the
dispute.
The statute should also codify basic notions of arbitration procedure now hidden in a maze of
often inconsistent cases that delight those wishing to sabotage an arbitration. In particular, the statute
should allow arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, and should confirm that
arbitration clauses remain effective notwithstanding the invalidity of other contract provisions.132 Other
areas in need of clarification include the interaction of federal and state arbitration law,133 pre-award
attachment,134 consolidation of proceedings,135 the validity of attempts to expand judicial review by

the more circumscribed nature of these procedural defects make them less likely to cause mischief.
132

These principles of "coméptence-compétence" and "separability" are discussed in William
W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and
Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133 (1997). See also Antonias Dimolitsa, Autonomie et
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz," 1998 REV. ARB. 305 (1998).
Compare Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (arbitration in California stayed under
provisions of state law on assumption that the parties had incorporated California arbitration law into
their agreement); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (upholding award
for punitive damages notwithstanding choice-of-law clause designating state law that prohibited such
awards); Doctor's Association v. Casarotto, 514 U.S. 52 (1996) (striking down Montana notice
statute requiring arbitration clauses to be in capital letters on the first page of the contract).
133

Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974) (pre-award
attachment denied); Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (preaward attachment allowed); Cooper v. Ateliers Motobecane, 57 N.Y.2d 408 (1982) (pre-award
attachment permitted by state legislation held inconsistent with the New York Convention).
134

135

The Federal Arbitration Act does not authorize forced consolidation of different
proceedings, even if they present similar questions of law and fact. See United Kingdom v. Boeing,
998 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993) (denying consolidation of arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc.
relating to contract with the British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system).
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contract136 and the allocation of jurisdictional functions between judges and arbitrators.137

C. What Makes Arbitration International?
Some nations have retreated from separate legal frameworks for domestic and international
arbitration, fearing that such distinctions conflict with treaty prohibitions on nationality-based
discrimination.138 These concerns (whether or not justified) might be met by characterization methods
that look to the nature of the transaction139 or the parties' residences.140

Compare Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.
1995) (stating that federal court review power cannot be created by contract), with Lapine Tech.
Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997) (parties permitted to expand scope of judicial
review), and Gateway Technologies v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995)
(court allows de novo review of issues of law according to parties' agreement).
136

See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (suggesting in dictum that in
some cases courts must defer to arbitrators' decisions on their jurisdiction). See generally William W.
Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan, 12 ARB. INT'L 137 (1996). In particular,
the circuits are split on whether time limits contained in arbitration rules constitute a jurisdictional
prerequisite to be determined by courts. See cases summarized in PaineWebber v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589
(1st Cir. 1996).
137
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In England, the 1979 Arbitration Act prohibited pre-dispute waiver of appeal on points of
English law in contracts among residents and/or citizens of the United Kingdom. Similar provisions in
§87 of the 1996 Arbitration Act never entered into force due to a perceived conflict with Article 6 (to
be renumbered to Article 12 pursuant to the Treaty of Amsterdam, see OFFICIAL JOURNAL C340, at
185 (1997)) of the Treaty on European Union, which forbids "discrimination on the grounds of
nationality."
French NCPC Article 1492 defines arbitration as international if it "implicates international
commerce."
139

140

See, e.g., Swiss LDIP arts. 176, 140, 192.
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As between these approaches,141 a residence-based test seems more sensible.142 The special
status of international arbitration justifies itself as a way to promote neutrality in dispute resolution
among commercial actors from different countries. Difficult linguistic and procedural issues are more
likely to arise when Boston merchants sue buyers in Beijing or Cairo than when they bring litigation in
Chicago against an American supplier of goods destined for export.

Conclusion
Constructing an efficient framework for arbitration requires legislators and courts to engage in a
process of legal fine tuning that balances a winner's concern for finality against a loser's desire for
procedural safeguards. While a golden mean will remain elusive, national arbitration law can seek a
reasonable counterpoise between arbitral autonomy and judicial control mechanisms.143
To this end, the United States should adopt an international arbitration act making clear that the
protective review standards appropriate for domestic disputes will not affect cross-border arbitration.
This statute should also clarify, with respect to international commercial disputes, critical issues such as
141

The UNCITRAL Model Law in §1(3) adopts both tests, characterizing arbitration as
international if the parties' places of business are in different states or the transaction has a connection to
a state other than the parties' places of business. In addition, the Model Law allows parties to opt to
treat their agreement as international.
142

The statute might cover disputes of a pecuniary nature unless entirely among American
residents. Corporations and partnerships would be considered U.S. residents if organized under
American law, or if they have a principal place of business in the United States. A U.S. branch of a
foreign corporation would be considered a U.S resident. An individual would be considered a resident
if physically present in the United States more than 183 days during any calendar year.
See, e.g., Klaus-Peter Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in
Germany, 13 MEALEY'S INT’L ARB. REP. 38, 39 (Jan. 1998).
143
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the relationship between federal and state arbitration law and the contours of an arbitrator's right to
determine his or her own jurisdiction.
Not all nations, however, follow this ideal. Weighing arbitration's costs and benefits differently,
some countries impose court scrutiny of a dispute's legal merits, while others allow waiver of all preenforcement review. If business managers choose to arbitrate in such jurisdictions, there is no reason to
disregard the implications of these choices in an attempt to squeeze the entire world into the same
Procrustean arbitral mold. Should commercial actors find a country’s review standards burdensome
or inadequate, the market will direct their next arbitration to a place more compatible with the desired
level of judicial control.144
Recognition of vacated awards should depend not on the nature of the annulment standard, but
on whether the annulment was made in good faith and comports with fundamental notions of justice.
The touchstone for deference to court judgments about arbitration, as to arbitral awards themselves,
lies in the absence of fraud and undue influence, and conformity with basic notions of international
public policy.

144

One is reminded of Justice Holmes’s comment that “[t]he most enlightened judicial policy is
to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very
clear.” See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 31 U.S. 373, 386 (1911) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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